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THE RAILROAD COMMISSION AS A MODEL FOR
JUDICIAL REFORM1
"JUSTICE," said Daniel Webster, "is the greatest interest of
man on earth. It is the ligature which holds civilized beings and
civilized nations together. Wherever its temple stands, and so
long as it is honored, there is a foundation for social security,
general happiness and the improvement and progress of our race.
And whoever labors upon this edifice with usefulness and distinc-
tion, whoever clears its foundations, strengthens its pillars, adorns-
its entablatures, or contributes to raise its august dome still higher
to the skies, links himself in name, fame, and character with that
which is, ahd must be, as durable as the frame of human society."
It is our high privilege and duty as members of the Bar to tend
the flame which burns in the Temple of Justice so that all who
journey to the Temple, be they men, women or children, rich or
poor, shall have justice administered to them simply, directly and
fairly. Are the lawyers of America doing their duty?
Speaking before the American Bar Association in 1916, Elihu
Root said:
"Every lawyer knows that the continual reversal of judg-
ments, the sending of parties to a litigation to and fro between
the trial courts and the appellate courts, has become a disgrace
to the administration of justice in the United States. Everybody
knows that the vast network of highly technical rules of evidence
and procedure which prevails in this country serves to tangle
justice in the name of form. It is a disgrace to our profession.
It is a disgrace to our law and a discredit to our institutions."
1 Based upon the annual address delivered before the California State
Bar Association, September 27, 1917.
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\Villiam iH. Taft, in his presidential message of December
1910, declared :-
"One great crying need in the United States is cheapening the
cost of litigation by simplifying procedure and expediting final
judgment. Under present conditions, the poor man is at a voe-
ful disadvantage in a legal contest with the corporation or a rich
opponent. The necessity for reform exists both in the United
States courts and in all the state courts."
Roscoe Pound, now dean of Hlarvard Law School, said to the
American Bar Association in 1906:'
"Our system of courts is archaic and our procedure behind
the times. Uncertainty, delay and expense, and above all the in-
justice of deciding cases upon points of practice, which are the
mere etiquette of justice-direct results of the organization of our
courts and the backwardness of our procedure-have created a
deep seated desire to keep out of court, 'right or wrong, on the
part of every sensible business man in the community."
These strictures on the procedure of our courts are not new.
For years our bar associations, both state and national, have
been drawing attention to these conditions and have resolved that
they should be remedied. However, apart from the reform by
the Supreme Court of the United States of the Equity Rules in
the federal courts and the institution of the municipal court of
Chicago and a few similar courts, little actual progress has been
made in the reform of court procedure.
In the meantime, our people have become more and more dis-
contented with the delays and technicalities which attend the
administration of justice by most of our courts. Out bf this dis-
content has sprung the most significant phenomenon in the recent
judicial history of the United States-the determination of con-
troversies by the simple and efficient procedure of administrative
tribunals instead of by the courts.
The administration of justice by administrative boards or
commissions is not merely of great historic interest but also, in
my opinion, points definitely and concretely to specific steps
which can be taken to insure a more direct, speedy and satisfac-
tory administration of justice in the courts.
I prefer to be constructive rather than destructive. It would
give me far more satisfa'ction to face forward and to render as-
sistance in actually producing a better order of things than to
contemplate and benoan the imperfections of the present. For
246 Coniz. Rec. 24. 61st Con'res 3rd Sess.
:'Am. Bar Ass'n Reo. 1906 p. 408.
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that reason, in the hope that I may in this way be helpful in point-
ing the way to what may be done in the courts, I shall devote the
major portion of this paper to the determination of controversies
by administrative tribunals.
This movement in the United States began with the state rail-
road commission. In 1864, conservative Massachusetts estab-
lished the first railroad commission. Their number has increased
until now each of the 48 states of the Union, with the exception
of Delaware, has a state railroad or public service commission.
Similar commissions have been established in the District of Col-
umbia and in the Territory of Hawaii.
The regulation of railroads was the first work of these com-
missions. Their powers at the beginning were largely advisory.
Their jurisdiction has grown until at the present time the com-
missions in most of the states regulate other classes of public utili-
ties, as well as railroads. These commissions now exercise im-
portant judicial as well as administrative functions.
A marked similarity exists between these various state com-
missions. All seek to administer justice speedily and efficiently.
All try to dispose of complaints informally without the necessity
of formal hearings. The pleadings in their formal proceedings
are simple, the hearings direct and to the point and the decisions
generally promptly rendered. The railroad.commissions all rep-
resent a definite and largely an effective revolt against the techni-
calities and the delays of many of our courts.
The Railroad Commission of California is typical of the vigor-
ous, effective railroad and public service commissions of today.
From the beginning of its reorganization in March, 1912, it has
been my earnest hope that this commission, while fair, just and
constructive to the public utilities and their patrons alike, -might
also be of service in blazing the way for the more simple, speedy
and effective administration of justice by the courts. It has been
my dream that this commission, created primarily to regulate pub-
lic utilities, might at the same time do a work equally as great in
restoring the faith of those who worship at the flame which glows
in the Temple of Justice.
The California Railroad Commission has been referred to as
the work of the laity in protest against the lawyers. On the con-
trary, few pieces of constructive legislation in the United States
owe their inception and execution more to lawyers than the re-
organized Railroad Commission. The political reorganization of
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California from which the reorganized Railroad Commission
sprang, was largely done by lawyers under the leadership of a
great lawyer, Hiram NV. Johnson. The Stetson-Eshleman Act
of 1911 was written by two lawyers. The Public Utilities Act, "
which became effective in March, 1912, was written by a third
lawyer, who also wrote the rules of procedure under which the
Railroad Commission operates. Ever since the reorganization of
the Railroad Commission in 1912, a majority of the comnmis-
sioners have been lawyers. These things, it is true, were done
largely as a protest against the delays and the technicalities of
court procedure, but they were done by lawyers who sincerely and
earnestly desired to assist their profession and the people of
the state by substituting simplicity, equity and phomptness for
technicality, form and delay.
The fault in connection with court proceedings lies not so
much with the lawyers as with the archaic and wasteful machin-
ery of the law in accordance with which they are compelled to
practice law in the courts. What we ought to do, in my judg-
ment, instead of criticising the lawyers, is to take a committee
of our lawyers who are bold and constructive and who have
marked executive ability and give to them the task of sweeping
away the present procedure of our courts and substitute in lieu
thereof an entirely new structure which shall cover the entire
ground from the first pleading until the decision on the last ap-
peal in the state courts. When the administration of justice in
our courts has thus been made simple, direct and effective, no one
will more ardently champion the new order of things than the
majority of the lawyers.
To show the respects in which the modern state commission
has departed in its procedure from our courts of law, and in the
hope that the visualization of. its proceedings may be helpful in
making more satisfactory the procedure of our courts, I shall,
with a few strokes of the pen, paint the picture of the administra-
tion of justice by the Railroad Commission of California.
in order that the picture may be complete, I shall refer to the
procedure applicable to Railroad Commission cases, from the be-
ginning to the end, from the filing of the formal complaint to the
decision of the state supreme court on writ of review.
With certain minor exceptions, to which it is not necessary
here to refer, all public utilities in the state are subject to regu-
Cal. Statutes 1911 Extra Sess. Chap. 14. Const. of California, Art.
XTT. Secs. 22, 23.
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lation by the Railroad Commission. In exercising its regulatory
powers, the Commission has functions partly administrative and
partly judicial. The proceedings before the Railroad Commission
are divided into those which are infornal and those which are
formal. Formal proceedings are those which require notice and
hearing. All others are informal. Each year the Railroad Com-
mission adjusts about four thousand informal complaints. These
complaints come to the Commission by letter or verbally. The
Commission takes them up promptly with the utility affected,
either by letter or in person, and seeks to secure an adjustment
fair to both parties. 1 am glad to be able to say that in a great
majority of these cases a settlement satisfactory to both parties
is reached by the Commission in this entirely informal way.
All commissions, state and federal, strive, in so far as possi-
ble, to determine controversies informally. In this paper, I shall
confine myself to formal proceedings.
The provisions of the Public Utilities Act with reference to
formal complaints are very simple. The Act provides that com-
plaint may be made by the Railroad Commission on its own mo-
tion or by any injured party by complaint in writing, setting forth
any act or thing done or omitted to be done by any public utility.
Upon the filing of such complaint, it is the duty of the Commis-
sion to cause a copy thereof to be served upon the defendant. The
Act provides that the Commission shall fix the time and place of
hearing and shall serve notice thereof, whereupon the hearing is
held and the decision rendered. Unless otherwise provided in
the decision, the Commission's orders are effective twenty days
from date.
The Public Utilities Act provides that the Railroad Commis-
sion shall have the power to adopt its own rules of practice and
procedure."
In view of the discussions that have taken place for a number
of years at many meetings of the various state bar associations and
of the American Bar Association with reference to the advisabil-
ity of empowering the courts to prepare their own rules of prac-
tice and procedure, it is interesting to note that the legislature of
California conferred this power upon the Railroad Commission
without any opposition and without even any discussion.
In March 1912, after conference with leading lawyers of the
state, the Railroad Commission adopted Rules of Procedure
5 Ibid., Sec. 53. Ghriest v. Railroad Commission. (1915) 170 Cal. 63,
148 Pac. 195.
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which, with slight modifications, have been effective ever since.
The rules provide boldly for the elimination of all demurrers and
dilatory motions. The only motion permitted is a motion to
dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. I shall never for-
get the horror with which leading members of our profession in
California regarded this innovation. The Railroad Commission
was told, in effect, that a lawyer has a constitutional right to de-
mur and to interpose dilatory motions, and that no procedure
which does not provide for these pleadings and for the intermin-
able delays which result therefrom can possibly succeed. The best
proof of a pudding is in the eating thereof. I venture to say
that if it were today proposed to restore demurrers and dilatory
motions in the proceedings before the Railroad Commission, such
a proposal would meet with the vigorous opposition of every
lawyer who practices before the Railroad Commission.
In order not to break too suddenly with the procedure and
traditions of the past, the Railroad Commission provided in its
rules of procedure that upon the filing of a complaint, a copy there-
of is immediately mailed to the defendant who is directed to ad-
vise the Commission in writing within five days as to whether
there is anything in the form of the complaint to which substan-
tial objection can reasonably be made. Although at first objection
to the form of the complaint was frequently made, the Commis-
sion is now generally advised by the public utility that it has no
objection to the form of the complaint. Not infrequently the de-
fendant goes further and at once files its answer without wait--
ing for formal service of the complaint. If no reply is received
within fi',e days, or if such objection as is made is found to be in-
consequential, a copy of the complaint is then formally served by
the Commission upon the defendant together with notice to
satisfy the same or to file an answer within ten days. I may say
parenthetically that the lawyers practicing before the Railroad
Commission have been so well trained that answers are generally
filed within the ten days allowed and that if a request for an ex-
tension of time to file an answer is made, the extension if granted
rarely exceeds a few days. The Commission tries to be courteous
in the matter of extensions of time but has in mind constantly the
necessity of keeping its business moving.
As a result of the rules of procedure adopted by the Commis-
sion and the co-operation of the litigants appearing before it,
formal complaints are generally ready to be set for hearing within
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twenty days after the filing of the complaint. As soon as the
answer is filed, the case is promptly assigned and set for hearing.
Hearings are generally held by a single commissioner or ex-
aminer. The most important cases are heard by several com-
missioners or by the Connission en banc. Hearings are held in
the particular community affected so that all parties interested
may appear and be heard with a minimum of expense and incon-
venience. It is not necessary that parties be represented by coun-
sel, but in important cases the litigants generally appear by attor-
neys.
The atmosphere of the hearing before a typical state coni-
mission is entirely different from the atmosphere of many of our
courts. A hearing before a state railroad or public service com-
mission is not a contest between trained intellectual gladiators,
each seeking to take advantage of ever), technicality and both
frequently trying the procedure instead of the facts of the case.
A hearing before a state commission is a simple and direct in-
vestigation to ascertain the facts. The presiding commissioner
is not an umpire for the purpose of seeing to it that counsel play
the game in a particular way. His function is to have the facts
developed as promptly and as fully as possible. His attitude is
that of a co-investigator and he feels entirely at liberty to take
an active part in the examination and cross- examination of wit-
nesses.
The theory of proceedings before the California Railroad
Commission and similar commissions is that the state itself is in-
terested in the ascertainment of the truth. Accordingly, the Rail-
road Commission's own experts investigate the facts and intro-
duce their reports in evidence, being subject to cross-examination
in exactly the same manner as other witnesses.
In so far as possible, the parties are urged to present their
testimony in the form of reports instead of orally. Recently, in
an important rate case pending before the Railroad Commission
counsel for the utility presented a witness on the question of land
values. He began to testify with reference to each parcel of
land involved, giving his views in detail, as would be (lone in
court. Testimony on the same issue affecting the same utility re-
cently consumed months of time in one of the local federal courts.
After this testimony had run along for a while, the presiding com-
missioner suggested that much time could be saved if the wit-
ness would put his conclusions in the form of --a written, report,
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which could then be examined by the parties, the witness being re-
called for only such cross-examination as might seem wise after
careful inspection of his report. The attorneys for both sides
readily agreed to this procedure, which will result in having the
entire matter presented in a day or two instead of consuming
weeks or months.
One of the distinctive features of practically all administra-
tive tribunals exercising judicial functions is that they are not
bound by the technical rules of evidence. Specific provision to
this effect is contained in the California Public Utilities Act.6
Every business man regulates his conduct in the affairs of life
largely on hearsay evidence and other evidence which would not
be admitted in a court of law. He does so because it is the sen-
sible thing to do and because he trusts himself to give to the evi-
dence only the weight to which it is entitled. Only too fre-
quently the technical rules of evidence result in concealing the
truth instead of permitting it to be developed. The California
Railroad Commission accepts hearsay evidence whenever it be-
lieves that such evidence will assist in developing the truth, but
never rests its decisions solely on hearsay evidence. Objections
to the introduction of evidence are seldom made before the Cali-
fornia Commission, except occasionally by some lawyer who
comes before the Commission for the first time still corrupted by
the practice of the courts. To those who. practice daily before
the courts it will be unnecessary for me to direct attention to the
enormous saving of time which results from the absence of objec-
tions to evidence.
The filing of briefs is generally discouraged by the Commis-
sion by reason of the delay in the decision which ensues there-
from. The Commission always analyzes the testimony carefully
in any event and generally the filing of briefs is not helpful.
Where questions of law are involved and in important proceed-
ings, the filing of briefs is permitted and at times encouraged, but
counsel are asked to co-operate with the Commission in having
the briefs filed as promptly as possible. Counsel practicing be-
fore the Commission understand that such briefs as are filed must
be short and to the point.
The commissioner or examiner presiding in the particular pro-
ceeding prepares and presents to the Commission a draft of opin-
6 Ibid., Sec. 53.
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ion and order, which, when approved and ordered filed, become
the opinion and order of the Railroad Commission.
I shall now refer to the procedure subsequent to the rendering
of the decision. In this respect, the California Public Utilities
Act went further in the elimination of delays and in making
the Commission's work effective than any railroad commission
or public utilities act of any of the states prior thereto. In no
other.respect has the California Act been more widely commented
upon and followed in so far as the constitutions of other states
would permit.
Referring first to rehearings, the Public Utilities Act provides
that no cause of action shall arise in any court out of any order
or decision of the Railroad Commission, in favor of any person
or corporation who has not made, before the effective date of the
order or decision, application to the Railroad Commission for a
rehearing. The petition for rehearing must set forth specifically
the grounds of rehearing and -no ground not thus set forth can
be urged in any court.7 These provisions have been sustained
both by the supreme court of this state8 and by the federal courts.9
Their purpose is obvious. If there is any reasonable ground for
objection to a decision of the Railroad Commission, it is mani-
festly desirable that such objection shall be pointed out to the
Commission and that the Commission shall have an opportunity
to review its decision in the light of such objection before the par-
ties are plunged into the delays which inevitably ensue from court
proceedings. When a petition for rehearing is filed, the Railroad
Commission is given an opportunity, if it has made an error, to
modify its decision or to grant a rehearing. In quite a num-
ber of cases, the decision as originally made has been modified and
the necessity for proceedings in the courts has been avoided.
A writ of review lies directly from the Railroad Commission
to the supreme court. No other court of the state has power to
review, reverse, correct or annul any order or decision of the
Commission. Nothing could have more injured the efficiency of
the Commission than to have. had its decisions rendered inopera-
tive for long periods of time by proceedings, first, before the su-
perior courts, then before the district courts of appeal and, finally,
before the supreme court. The decisions of the Commission
7 Ibid., Sec. 66.
8 Clemmons v. Railroad Commission, (1916) 173 Cal. 254, 159 Pac. 713.
9 Palermo Land & Water Co. v. Railroad Commission, (1915) 227 Fed.
708.
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which are taken to the courts are generally such that the losing
party would not be satisfied in any event until he had secured
the decision of the supreme court of the state. The framers of
the Act believed that it would be a waste of time to permit pro-
ceedings in the lower courts and hence provided for review solely
and directly by the supreme court, in the hope and in the confident
expectation that these provisions would be sustained. I am glad
to be able to say that the supreme court of this state has upheld
this procedure.';
The Public Utilities Act provides that the findings of the Rail-
road Commission on questions of fact shall be conclusive. With-
out any statutory provisions whatever, the Supreme Court of the
United States has repeatedly held that the findings of the Inter-
state Commerce Commission on questions of fact are conclusive,
at least in the absence of fraud or of any evidence whatsoever to
sustain the findings. Similar effect has been given to the findings
of state railroad and public service commissions, both by the state
courts and by the federal courts. The conclusion thus reached
seems to be both just and reasonable. When an expert body has
passed on the facts, its conclusions thereon should be final if it
has acted honestly.
I remember very well in this connection an opinion expressed
by the late Commissioner Eshleman in connection with this very
matter. When this subject was under consideration and when
he was hearing the objections of certain public utility represen-
tatives, he said that some of them would not be satisfied unless
the\- had twenty successive appeals and that then they would
still be dissatisfied unless they could take one further appeal to
God Almighty.
Inquiry may appropriately be made as to how the siu-ple and
direct procedure established by the Public Utilities Act and by the
Commission's Rules of Procedure operates and particularly as to
whether justice is done thereunder.
Since March 23, 1912, the Railroad Commission has renJered
over 4,500 decisions in formal proceedings. Ninety-nine per cent
of these decisions have become effective without appeal to the
courts. Of the remaining one per cent, I am glad to be able to
say that the federal courts have decided in favor of the Railroad
Commission each case which has been brought before them affect-
10 Pacific Telephone Co. v. Eshleman, (1913) 166 Cal. 640, 137 Pac.
1119, Ann. Cas. 1915C, 822, 50 L. R. A. (N.S.) 652.
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ing the Commission and that before the state supreme court the
Commission has fared almost equally as well, subsequent to tha
first three or four contests.
Furthermore, as far as I have been able to observe, both the
public utilities and the representatives of the public are satisfied
that the Railroad Commission's simple and direct procedure has
not deprived them of any substantial rights and that the decisions
of the Railroad Commission have generally been fair and just.
Of course, we could hardly expect that a public utility ciaiming
enormous values for franchises which have been freely granted
to it by the public or excessive, values for water rights or so called
intangibles would express satisfaction with the Railroad Com-
mission's procedure. However, apart from a few sporadic cases
of this kind, I think I may safely say that there is a consensus of
opinion that the. procedure of the California Railroad Commis-
sion and similar state railroad and public service commissions
produces speed, efficiency and justice.
Another type of administrative tribunals in which simple and
prompt procedure is applied is the Industrial Accident Commi,3-
sion or Workmen's Compensation Commission of the principal
states of the Union. This type of tribunal had its genesis in thE
decision of the courts of the State of New York, holding uncon-
stitutional a Workmen's Compensation Act of that state."
The people of New York replied by a constitutional amend-
ment and statutory enactments, overwhelmingly adopted, which
not merely changed the substantive law with reference to the
relationship between employer and employee but went further
and took the entire administration of that law away from the
courts and conferred it upon an administrative tribunal with sim-
ple procedure.
The movement toward the administration of justice by coin-
missions instead of by the courts has resulted in the establish-
ment of a number of powerful federal commissions, whose proce-
dure is modeled more or less after that of the state commissions,
which led the way. The most conspicuous example of these fed-
eral commissions is the Interstate Commerce Commission, which
is charged with the duty of regulating and supervising in certain
respects interstate railroads and other carriers, including now /
telephone and telegraph companies. By amendment to the Inter-
state Commerce Act, from time to time, the procedure before the
1 Ives v. South Buffalo Ry. Co., (1911) 201 N. Y. 271, 94 N. E. 431.
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Interstate Commerce Commission and on review of its decisions
is now closely analogous to the proceedings before the modern
effective state railroad or public service commissions.
The recently created Federal Trade Commission adopts in the
exercise of its limited judicial functions an analogous procedure.
I have tried to portray briefly and succinctly, the growth and
practice of the state and federal commissions which exercise judi-
cial powers and which try most earnestly to live up to the ideal
of justice simply and promptly administered. By those who dis-
approve of them, they are at times referred to as "lunch counter"
tribunals. Why this name,, I am not quite certain-perhaps be-
cause justice is supposed to be administered by them with the
speed with which a man eats his lunch, or possibly because the
commissioners are assumed to work so hard that they have no
time for meals other than at the lunch counter. By those who
approve of them, these tribunals are frequently referred to as the
"peoples' courts," because in them the members of the public are
supposed to be able to have justice administered without osten-
tation or technicality, simply and promptly.
I have referred to these tribunals in the earnest hope that an
understanding of the methods by which they administer justice
may be helpful to the members of the Bar in the task of simpli-
fying judicial procedure on which they have been engaged dur-
ing the last few years.
Our country is today at war. Every man who loves his coun-
try realizes more than ever the need of service to the state and to
the nation. With the war has come to our people an understand-
ing of the imperative need for efficiency in all branches of the
nation's life, including the courts.
In this exigency, the lawyer's obligation is clear. It is his
duty to sweep away the delays and technicalities of the law and
to make the administration of justice by our courts simple, speedy
and effective. We shall then again see the Temple of Justice
strong and stately and beautiful, with people from all ranks of
life flocking thither, their faith revived and having administered
to them simply, promptly and fairly, the greatest of all blessings
-Justice.
MAx THELEN.*
SAN FR~wcrsco.
*President of the Railroad Commission of California.
